POLICY ANALYSIS IN UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS CONTEXT: AGENDA FOR METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM*

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In this article we demonstrate why and how in the Western science of policymaking a challenge posited by empirical behaviouralism aimed at reforming the over-politicised policy process along the analytical-rational lines in 1950s did not succeed. However, it produced a meaningful shift in understanding the policy process and it formed by the 1970s a completely new conceptual context and discourse on the policy process. As a result, by the new millennium the positivist and constructivists perspectives, that are located at the opposite ends of the continuum of methodological presumptions, started to complement each other and even to intermingle at the level of providing practical policy solutions. In the first part we analyse how the cognitive limits and uncertainty of the context forces to re-focus policy analysis from substantive issues to the policy arena design, and to work out conceptions of interactive policymaking. Simultaneously several concepts of constructivist social science (frames, learning, narratives) were applied and adapted in the positivist perspective. We demonstrate why constructivist-interpretivist policy analysis could not for a long time get to the forefront of practical policy analysis. We demonstrate how the application of the pragmatist approach made it possible to develop the conception of design rationality. Overall, we explore the framework in which different methodologies would complement each other in providing policy advice and analysis from different practical angles.

Keywords: policy analysis, interactive policymaking, policy frames, policy learning, wicked issued, design rationality, method of critical dialogue.

In this review article¹ we would like to demonstrate why and how in the Western science of policymaking a challenge posited by empirical behaviouralism aimed at

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reforming the over-politicised policy process along the analytical-rational lines in 1950s did not succeed [Hoppe, 2010]. However, it produced a meaningful shifts in understanding of the policy process and it formed by 1970s a completely new conceptual context and discourse on the policy process. As a result, by the new millennium the positivist and constructivists perspectives, that are locating at the opposite ends of continuum of methodological presumptions, started to complement each other and even to intermingle at the level of providing practical policy solutions. We could even speak about emergence of a kind of methodological pluralism on the real policy analysis [Thissen, Walker, 2013].

In the article we focus, firstly the adaptation of positivist-rationalist conceptions of the policy process to practical challenges of policy analysis and its failures coming largely from that intents. Secondly, we intend to indicate on the main turning points, when positivist paradigm started to complement and then intermingle with constructivist approach. Their methods become complementary (but in no way similar) in exploring the policy process in extremely complex, uncertain, ambiguous and ambivalent task and institutional environment. Both started to draw on such a core concepts central for policy analysis like frames, policy learning, uncertain context, narratives etc. This emergence of compatibilities largely draws on the imbuement of ideas and presumptions of pragmatist methodology from both — from positivist (Charles Lindblom) and constructivist (Martin Rein) — ends. Thirdly, the purpose of this article is also to indicate the possible ways of the re-assessment of the role of Soviet time psychology (Vygodski, Leontiev, Galperin) as well as dialectical Marxists logic [Ilyenkov, 1977], not to speak about works of Merab Mamardashvili, in developing the new — pragmatist — understanding of current politics and government in Russia (see: [Glassmann, 2001]).

**POLICY ANALYSIS AS EXPERT’S DRIVEN PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING: LIMITS OF RATIONAL ACTOR AND POLICY DESIGN**

In the end of 1940s H. Laswell’s developed a couple of basic ideas in developing the policy sciences. This was basically aimed to increase the role of evidence, analytical stance and planning methods in policymaking, where then largely political consideration “Who Gets What, When, and How” determined policy decisions. At the core of this shift was the turn to behaviouralist’ methodology in the policy analysis, which already has proved its value in economics and decision-making (operation studies). This Lasswellian purpose was summarized in Wildawsky’s famous mission of “speaking truth to powers” [Wildawsky, 1979]. This program was also an instrumental response to the current military competition with Soviet Union and to its planning system in ensuring country’s competitiveness in military contest. This accompanied

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2 There is necessary to differentiate the term “behavioural” as general methodology for social theory from of “behaviourism” in psychology (see: [Falter, 2011]).

3 However, a year later in the UK Macmillan edition [the phrase “Speaking truth to power” was omitted in the title and “The art and craft of policy analysis” was not incidentally set instead at the forefront [Wildavsky, 1980; cf: Wildavsky, 2018, p. XIX–XXVI].
in the transfer a successful Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and RAND type analytical centres from the defence area to the policymaking in civic domains in the US. This shift enhanced the role of policy analyst as an academic field. But even more it makes policy analysis into a large branch of business activity with its powerful lobby [Radin, 2000]. However, expectations that extensive application of theoretical-rational planning methods would reduce a highly political (and value laden) orientation in the policy process, did not justified expectations. The PPBS boom resulted already in 1960s in failures of various policy programs in US.

These general trends were mirrored in three articles of classics of positivist policy science in mainstream journals of policy sciences American Political Science Review and Public Administration Review. Firstly, already in 1961 Robert Dahl published the article “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest”. He summarizes his analysis: “The scientific outlook in political science can easily produce a dangerous and dysfunctional humility: the humility of the social scientist who may be quite confident of his findings on small matters and dubious that he can have anything at all to say on larger questions... So far, I think, the impact of the scientific outlook has been to stimulate caution rather than boldness in searching for broad explanatory theories” [Dahl, 1961, p. 772].

Secondly in 1969 a founder of behavioural theory of political systems David Easton [Easton, 1957] published twelve years later the manifesto of post-behavioralism. He wrote: “Behavioural science conceals an ideology of empirical conservatism. To confine oneself exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hamper the understanding of these same facts in their broadest context. /.../ It unwittingly purveys an ideology of social conservatism tempered by modest incremental change” [Easton, 1969, p. 1052].

Third, the founding dean of Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkley Aron Wildavsky warned about the overestimation of practical application of fashionable Planning, Programming and Budgeting method in the policy support: “A belief in the desirability of policy analysis — the sustained application of intelligence and knowledge to social problems- is not enough to insure its success, no more than to want to do good is sufficient to accomplish noble purposes. /.../ It is clear that those who introduced the PPB system into the federal government in one fell swoop did not undertake a policy analysis on how to introduce policy analysis into the federal government” [Wildavsky, 1969, p. 170].

On the one hand, this indicated a serious impasse in developing behavioural policy-analytical expertise. On the other hand, it indicated the healthy reflective stance of the positivist mainstream in defining its cognitive boundaries and also further conversions of this analytical stream to real tool for policy analysis.

**LIMITS OF COGNITION AND THE POLICY PROCESS**

Mainstream of policy science which based on positivist presumptions were at the outset sceptical about the presumption of rational actor as the practical theory. Herbert Simon and Charles Lindblom developed from different theoretical angles a fruitful debate on why and how to simplify individual choices in the conditions of lim-
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limited human cognitive capacities and the complexity of the reality in order to ensure purposeful/intentional promotion of its aims. Cognitive bricolages become a general tool for increasing actors’ intentionality and practical effectiveness in the policy and decision-making in contexts where a completely rational premise could not be followed at the outset. This was clearly perspectivist turn in positivist tradition, i.e. to the presumption that the reality could be conceived only from the limited angle, which is caused by limited cognitive capacities of actors as well as its practical embeddedness in complex social reality. Herbert Simon developed from empirical behaviouralist positions in his “Administrative behaviour” in 1940s the theory of subjective rationality (see: [Zittoun, 2014])⁴. The decade later [Simon, 1957] he introduced a famous concept of bounded rationality. He insisted, that instead drawing on the positive feedback loops and selecting the best alternative from all possible multiple options, the median actor is simplifying his/her task and using the negative feedback loop to cast off the non-acceptable options, and thus chooses the first satisficing option (see in detail also: [Morgan, 2007]). I.e. it is enough when an actor is able for surely to avoid harmful choices. Later Simon specified that procedural rationality or intellectual processes would be sufficient for rational actions [Simon, 1996, p. 25]. Most importantly, Simon identified many simplifying heuristics (rules of thumb), which an actor is using when he/she is making choices in the complex context. Organisation is the main instrument which ease the choices and enables the individual purposeful behaviour. Those ideas transformed widely into the policy science.

Charles Lindblom did not satisfied with such a purely cognitive focus in analysing the limits of policy-making decisions. He explored the decision mechanisms form the angle of pluralist political science (see: [Lindblom, 1958; 1979]). Thus, he further contributed to the exploration of the reasonable behaviour and decisions and already started to rely on premises of pragmatism and offered a distinct interpretation of practical rationality. He developed the model of decision-making, which, firstly, recommend to break the policy issue into smaller pieces in order to make the issues simpler and easier to the fast analysis and for targeted political debates. Secondly, he suggested to draw on a set of simplifying and focusing strategems or shortcuts, à la limited successive comparison or tools of disjointed incrementalism to ease the analytical work of civil servants and politicians. This strategy of “quick and dirty” analysis [Radin, 2000; Colebatch 2010; 2011] spreads widely also in the practice. For, actual policymaking faces the hard time-limits and the need to proceed fast incremental solution in the context of heavy overload of policy agenda in developed democracies. Thirdly, the policymaking as reaching solutions between various stakeholders in a policy arena, who have different political interests, looks like muddling through of initial ideas. It results in decisions, which draws on previous experience and enables to add only marginal change to ensure only visible benefit and to lower risks of losses for every participant. F. Scharpf demonstrates, that overall welfare ef-

⁴ In other words, it is not because an individual is incapable of enumerating and calculating all move sequences in chess that he does not play chess. Indeed, the individual mixes intuition and subjective rationality to reduce the number of options until he reaches a number he can calculate, and then makes his choice [Zittoun, 2014, p. 47].
ffects of such incremental muddling through is larger than the effects of comprehensive reform projects, which tend to fail or result in least improvements vis-a-vis costs than initially expected [Scharpf, 1997, p. 247]. This concept gives a hint already to relational/transactional approach in explaining the political landscape, which originated from Dewey (see: [Dewey, Bentley, 1949, p. 131–143]).

This trend of simplification of the substance (or program content) of the policy analysis continues further within different positivist traditions. First of all within positivist tradition the framing theory emerged, which take from Simon idea of cognitive heuristics. Tversky and Kahnemann developed the prospect theory, which analysed specific cognitive biases of individual choices. The knowledge of those biases (or heuristics) enables to influence intentionally the actor’s choices (in advertising, but also in politics) but also to make them more beneficial for actors. This theory was used later by Nikos Zahariadis in its conception of agenda-setting [Zahariadis, 2003]. He presumed that framing of policies enable positively to manipulate with public as well as politicians perceptions of policy in order to focus their attention on certain policy issue in the decision-making agenda. Later, the nudging theory was developed on that basis which provide different techniques of directing ordinary citizens choices towards optimal trajectories from the perspective of policy aims’ as well as their individual welfare gains [Thaler, Sunstein, 2008].

In 1980s the concept of the policy learning as the interactive process of preference change was developed by Paul Sabatier in his theory of policy advocacy coalitions [Sabatier, 1986; 2007]. Simultaneously Elinor Ostrom in the framework of new institutionalist economics and Fritz Scharpf in the framework of actor-centred institutionalism definitively relinquish the presumption of pre-defined preferences of rational actors (see: [Ostrom, 1998; 2005; Scharpf, 1997]). They demonstrated how in the course of repeated interactions and mutual learning of actors the stable agreements and trust as institutional patterns emerge. This makes not only possible the promotion of rational, but also the Pareto-optimum outcomes (as compared with Nash equilibrium). I.e. the policy learning makes the positive sum game as a regular practical outcome of collective action. Nobel prize winner Douglass North demonstrated already that individual choices are not only determined by institutional frames, but also by individual mental maps, which frame practical-historical experience through specific lenses. Those were already clearly constructivist flavour in the theories on new institutional economics [Torfing, 2011, p. 1883].

In sum. The issues of the substance of policy or its program contents has relapsed more and more into background of the policy process. Simultaneously, because of increasing complexity of policy’s task environment issues of steering of the policy arenas and the art of fitting different stakeholder’s preferences and inputs into the integrated policy solutions becomes at the forefront in the theory as well as in the policy practice. Robert Hoppe summarizes this turn as the shift “from ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’” [Hoppe, 1999].
POLICY AS THE ART AND CRAFT OF RECONCILING AND INTEGRATING ACTORS IN THE POLICY PROCESS

This shift in the focus of policy analysis cumulated gradually however in works of mainstream positivist research. The first step of Garham Allison was merely the hint (see: [Allison, 1969]). In analysing decision-making in US during Carribean Missile Crisis in 1962 he revealed that the elaboration and making of substantive choices based on technical effectiveness was only one and — even in so uncertain (let say, catastrophic) context — not the major dimension of the policy decision. The major aspects of decision were firstly, political games, which aimed in improving better positions of actors in the domestic political landscape, and secondly, organisational (agencies) networks, which were rather resistant to flexible solution in extremely uncertain context and tried to rely on established routines and identities. One can imagine, what would be the proportion of these dimension in less volatile and catastrophic policy contexts: the role of organisational variables and political steering issues become in this very influential study at the forefront.

The second trigger was much radical. Herbert Simon followers M. Cohen, J. March and J. Olsen published in 1972 the breaking article "Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice". This classical sample of empirical behaviourism pictures the organisation as organized anarchy and decision-making in it — as a spontaneous process of filling the decision agenda (which was like the garbage can) by different actors. I. e. the decisions in such organisations look like the spontaneous output of incompatible inputs of actors. This article’s ideas bifurcated the understanding of the policymaking. On the one hand, the new-institutional theory of politics emerged, which brought back institutional or integrative logic into the chaotic world of purely aggregative politics, explored in empirical behaviouralism (see: [March, Olsen 1983; 1984; 1989]).

On the other hand, based on "garbage can" concept John Kingdon developed a new-style theoretizing about the policy process in "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies" [Kingdon, 1984]. He triggered a substantially new angle in interpreting policy process and policy analysis in positivist tradition. In this vision the policy process was pictured (from the perspective of empirical behavioralism) as a chaotic process of cooking the “primeval soup” in the policy community. Policy community was the concept which fuses the official decision-making actors and semi-official set of different actors and stakeholders, who deals with the policy process in their everyday activities. Thus the very substance of policies — policy problems and solutions — are worked out in this policy community. However, problems and its definition, and solutions have presented in this picture as a relatively different and autonomous streams in this primeval policy soup-cooking. Much frequently policy solutions become at the forefront of policymaking as much feasible/practical perspectives as compared with problem definition, which are largely ambiguous and passive complaints from differ-

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5 A bit later the concept of the logic of appropriattedness is becoming a central concept of new institutionalism. [March, Olsen, 1984].

6 This was empirical study of the board of faculty of social science at the University of California, Irvine, where authors worked.
ent stakeholders. Only after the politically feasible solutions are accepted at decision arenas, the problems become “attached” to solutions as merely legitimating, or at least not decisive triggers of political decisions. This reverse logic of problems/solutions sequence means, that the policy is far from being the linear process of solving the problems; rather the policy is actually non-linear and iterative process of finding politically acceptable and practically feasible solutions by political elites or whoever are dominating at the point of legitimate decision-making in society (see: [Conklin, 2006; Zittoun, 2016]). In such a way the policymaking process could adapt to the extreme uncertainty and ambiguity of the problem-situations. The concept and dynamic of the policy community was later developed by Rhodes (1988) into the theory of governance in policy networks.

The third shift was triggered by William Dunn [Dunn, 1981; 2002]. He draws on the Toulmin’s “informal logic” of practical reasoning and argumentation [Toulmin, 2003]. Dunn offers a dynamic conception of policy argumentation that moves from empirical data to the conclusions via a normative warrant and its backing. Of special importance is the model’s incorporation of rebuttal arguments and qualifications to the concluding claims or recommendations [Fischer, 2006, p. 229]. Thus Dunn’s argumentation focuses on not only on ideational variables and practical reason in working out policy solutions, which has been the domain of constructivist thought, but he also combines different data which are provided drawing on different methodologies.

What policy analysis learned from those shifts in the policy theory? The presumption of the scientific method is that it should discover a hidden order of the world: through the establishing causations and influencing causes we can predict, change or at least adapt to the reality in directions which are preferable to human existence. What they faced in the policy analysis was the increasing uncertainty and ambiguity, which could produce largely spontaneous outputs even in the realm of intentional activities. I. e. the reality should not explored only from the perspective of order or regularities (Demokritus’ paradigm). This vision should be at least complemented by exploration about how some kind of order would emerge from such overall contingency (Heraklitus’ paradigm).

Hence, the increasing reliance of positivist policy theories on constructivist concepts, like policy argumentation, practical knowledge, policy framing, policy learning, ideational variables, narratives etc. was not coincidental. Those concepts are substantial not only as simplifying tools, but also ways of generalizing or ordering in the context of extreme uncertainty and also making analysis practically resultative (see: [Hajer, Laws, 2004]).

Especially crucial has been the introduction of concepts of policy frames. Frames are formative lenses of interpretation of actor’s practical world, which is a perfect mental map (North) in orienting actor’s in their everyday practices. Frames are also lenses of interpretation of actor’s interests in policymaking process. However, different frames are as a rule not directly compatible because their inner logic is substantially different. For instance, we cannot state that peasants’ statements that sun is rising and setting is wrong as compared with astronomer’s statement that actually the Earth is revolving in a way we start to see the Sun and later we cease to see it. Moreover, this practical frames are not testable on truth because these views of ac-
tors are adequate for promoting practical aims (and outcomes). Hence, the purpose of policy analysis is not choosing the right (best) way of reasoning, but in bridging those frames and interests which are interpreted through these frames. This is exactly what the new angle on understanding of the policy process presumes.

Some scholars could avoid this drawing on the positivist presumption of self-interested actor’s in policy networks, who are playing political games at different arenas (see: [Susskind, McKearnan, Larmer, 1999; Susskind, 2006; Koopenjan, Klijn, 2004; 2016]). They developed the conception of interactive policymaking, which saw a source of successful policymaking in a more skilful management of those arenas. They suggest to break the policy process into parallel and multi-tier arenas where actors, composing different patterns of interactions, are searching for the new configurations of problems and solutions which patterns accidentally coinciding with their interests. For reaching to the mutually acceptable solutions they expected to draw on three devices. Firstly, basically they expect to reach through skilful nudging of actors foreground visions of expected utility to reach a set of tiny consensus of gamers on certain issues; whereas at the same time they continue to search the other such emergent patterns, where actors with different interests would find satisficing patterns of consent. Secondly, managers of such policy arenas should patiently direct actors to different aspects of problems and solutions, but at certain point they should use the stopping rule [Conklin, 2006]. This means the halting the endless process of finding solutions and post-hoc legitimizing the achieved solution in order to optimize the policy costs and time frame. Actually this is the only way to reach consensus in uncertain context. Thirdly, the agreements on decision package are formed, in which different sub-solution would have various fit with actor’s preferences; besides agreement on long term balancing of interests of actors would be achieved in the framework of “policy packages”. This strategy of managing complexity is substantially different from the unfolding of contingency.

F. Baumgartner and B. Jones have earlier explored such spontaneous emergence of new policies through punctuation mechanisms of stable policies [Baumgartner, Jones, 1993]. Hence, they are using the un-linear or bifrucational logic of changes on which usually constructivists authors are drawing. These punctuations means the break-through in the stable policy community and its integrated ideology, which could happen in some peripherial policy arena; hence the new frame of the policy could spread further to the whole policy domain. This happens because new actors who enter into the policy process would trigger firstly, the issue or problem extension. The extension of the old exploratory field means the emergence of new dimensions of an issue because of new actors with new visions and ideas come into the policy community. This in turn could cause, secondly, the attention shift, which results in the redefinition of the problem and re-constitution of the policy community which is handling the policy issue in a domain. Our example was the study of punctuation and redefinition of the drug addiction policy in Estonia. In 1990s the problem was considered primarily as criminal policy issue and handled by policy community, which consists predominantly of officials from law and order agencies. At the beginning of 2000s the drug addiction practice spill over into the middle class youth. The problem definitions shifted and was identified as the social problem, which presumes
rehabilitation policy. Hence, the officials and NGO from social and health protections as well as prevention policy tools started to prevail in the policy community and in defining the problem-situation [Tang, 2004].

F. Baumgartner and B. Jones draw heavily on system’s theories concepts of positive and negative feedback loops in exploring policy decisions and outcomes on chaotic and unpredictable policy context. The policy outputs emerged as a result of spontaneous re-couplings of subsystems (see: [Managing…, 2009]). In this approach which remains largely in the framework of positivist methodology the idea-tional variables (issue extension, attention shift, new ideas and angles of problem definitions) started to play a central role in explaining policy outcomes.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF POLICY ANALYST

These shifts in the evolution of the policy process and its theories has perfectly summarized by H. Colebatch and B. Radin in the evolution of roles of policy analyst (Table 1) [see: [Colebatch, 2010; Radin, 2000]].

Table 1. Evolution of roles and skills of policy analyst

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of analyst</th>
<th>Mission of analyst</th>
<th>Skills of analyst</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific — neutral analysis</td>
<td>Analysis of best alternatives</td>
<td>Statistics, research design, qualitative methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert of the policy domain</td>
<td>Support to the formation of policy substance in the policy domain</td>
<td>Domain expert and speaker for the domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor, advocate of the policy</td>
<td>Advocacy and justification of policy proposals</td>
<td>Knowledge of political landscape, presentation and legitimation skills, purchase of specific analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design and coordination of policy networks and arenas</td>
<td>Ensuring the targeted debate and quality of decisions</td>
<td>Facilitation and mediation of arenas, psychology of conciliation, generalizing policy outputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that the initial role of scientific analysis and focus of the program design have gradually narrowed down. Simultaneously the analyst becomes, firstly, as policy advocate and salesman in supporting his/her political masters. Secondly, the role of expert as policy coordinator becomes at the forefront simultaneously with the expertise in communication and conflict solution.
THE RISE OF CONSTRUCTIVIST-INTERPRETIVE STREAM IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS

We evidenced that majority of policy issues has moved towards the uncertainty, ambiguity and contextual focus, which is basic ontological premise of constructivists methodology. These trends as we see presumed the application of more sophisticated positivist methods to the policy analysis and forced to adapt by them many concepts of the policy analysis characteristics to constructivist approach. However, the demand of constructivist approaches for the policy analysis in government remained for a long time limited. Why?

Constructivist-interpretivist stream in the policy analysis flashed rather early with breaking insights concerning the policy process. Sir Geoffrey Vickers in his book “The Art of Judgement. A Study of Policy Making” (1965) introduced the concept of appreciative systems. His ideas were soon were developed further by Erving Goffman (1974), who provided a radical constructivist approach to the explanation of cognitive frames (see: [Vickers, 1995; Goffman, 1974]). From these constructivist perspective mental maps are not only cognitive restraints or heuristics, but practical lenses of interpretations of actors social and political world in ways that support his/ her practical experience. Cobb and Elder (1973) summarized a long tradition of social construction of policy problems, which dates back to works of classical pragmatist (Dewey and Mead) tradition and was explored in the dimension of policy in works of Fuller and Meyers, and Bossard already at the beginning of 1940s (see: [Cobb, Elder, 1971; Parsons, 1995]). This approach interpreted the policy problems rather differently as compared with analytical structuring and definition of social problems by W. Dunn [Dunn, 1981]. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber approached to problems from the newer angle. Their article on wicked issues shaked the foundations of classical presumption of decision-making. They also, like the “garbage can” and Kingdon’s theory of policy streams, pictured the policy process like iterative and chaotic interaction of policymakers and their task environment, in which solutions came first and problems are later justifying solutions. But they go further drawing on constructivist presumptions. They argued, that the policy cannot solve problems definitively; this is un-realistic task, like to aim to abolish the violation of laws or to ensure complete safety of traffic. This is because behind every problem, which can be seemingly solved (tamed) arise many new, much complicated bundle of interlinked problems (see: [Rittel, Webber, 1973]). Hence the policy process should at best patiently manage the problem situation and go in-depth in solving and revealing identifying new problems. Wicked problems theory remained for a long time relatively little-used, although Rittel’s IBIS (Issue-Based Information System) method of practical (trans-active) steering or mediating of discussions was highly used in the policymaking practice [Conklin, 2006].

Deborah Stone’s book “The Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making” (1988) translated mainstream political rhetoric into the language of narratives and causal stories. She demonstrated that seemingly rational policy reasoning has always contained subtly the logic of storytelling. She indicated that this form of rationality (deduced from literary theory) could effectively generalise, order and explore social reality in ways that ease the policy analysis of complex contexts and make
its understandable for common people which should change its behaviour to meet the policy aims. Few years later Emery Roe develops the method of narrative policy analysis, which also remained — with rare exceptions — little-used, although it had extremely high exploratory potential (see: [Stone, 2011; Fischer, Hajer, 1999; Roe, van Eeten 2004; Van Eeten, 2002]).

In 1993 Frank Fischer and John Forester collected works of core authors in the volume “The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning”. This becomes the manifesto of the role of practical reasoning as most effective input into the policy-making process [Fischer, Forester, 2002]. In 2003 a new generation of policy analyst from Europe Martin Hajer and Hendrik Wagemanar (2003) collected major works of this policy-analytical stream in the “Deliberative Policy Analysis. Understanding Governance in the Network Society” [Hajer, Wagemanar, 2003].

But, for a long time they largely were not able to enlarge their “market share” in the practical policy analysis. There were some edifying reasons for that, which would also be useful for future practical promotion of constructivist approach.

Firstly, many mainstream constructivists draw the justification of their conceptual positions as outright antithesis to positivist methodological positions, which were often simplified critique of straw-man. Positivist theories meantime have extensively adapted to new challenges and, as already noted, they started to use specifically adapted constructivists concepts. Meantime, we rarely can meet profound critique of limits, conditionality and weakness, i.e. self-critique of constructivism/interpretivism as the methodology of policy analysis (see: [Wagenaar, 2015]).

Secondly, many constructivist-interpretivist approaches are critical theories, inspired by neo- and post-marxism. They have tried not only to deconstruct the official political rhetoric and obviously reified structures; their policy analysis focussed primarily towards the excluded minority or marginal groups of society and to core social ills, which mainstream politics often try to omit as having socially negative images (See: [Schneider, Ingram, 2004; Schneider, Ingram, 2014]).

Thirdly, on the one hand, as a rule a rather sophisticated qualitative methods used in constructivist-interpretivist analysis have often used in rather unprofessional manner in the actual research practice by newcomers into research. Although constructivists methods heavily rely on extensive empirical data and on extremely sophisticated (and sometimes boringly detailed) conceptual analysis, the qualitative format enable to use those methods (case study, interview, narration analysis) in a rather simplistic way. This have reduced the attractiveness of those methods in the practical policy analysis. The latter, however, prefers also effective visual exhibits and complex numerical calculations: numbers are ideologically and politically a very effective tools for legitimizing the analysis. On the other hand, the exploratory capacity of a very extensive but highly contextual empirical data would be rather limited and applicable to a very specific context. The insufficient generalisation capacity is a bottleneck of constructivist analysis unless the political attractiveness of “grand narratives” and their practical infeasibility in handling complex problems, like immigration and climate change policy has not yet been convincingly proofed.

These specific of constructivist analysis has created their image as quetching by-standers or even anecdote tellers [Ann Lin, 1998, p. 72] on acute policy issues.
Paradoxically, their willingness to be sensitive to social issues has co-existed in the constructivist tradition with the trend to diminish the role of politics and power in their normative images of deliberative policy making. First of all, this has been characteristic to representatives of deliberative democracy theory (see: [Torfing, Peters, Pierre, Sörensen, 2012, p. 48–70]). However, politicians and policymakers need the policy advice which draws on “quick and dirty” analysis. Constructivist policy analysis used to provide much academic and ambiguous receipts. We see, that the positivist started to criticise their own social conservatism [Easton, 1969, p. 1052], which had diminished the political dimension of their policy analysis. However, the critical stance of constructivist research, which policy recommendation would sometimes be rather critical or too normative vis-a-vis existing policies could not — for the reason of absence of political dimensions — even attract the attention and interest of politicians.

Fourth. Misunderstanding and limits of the potentials of the constructivist-interpretivist policy analysis has perfectly explored Wagenaar in his “Meaning in action: interpretation and dialogue in policy analysis”. One of the core issue is the very interpretation of the concept “social construction” in its practical dimensions. In Berger and Luckmann “Social Construction of Reality” the initial task of authors was to develop the sociology of knowledge. They focussed on the demonstration how the knowledge (ideas, meanings) is created and functions as the outcomes of (intra) subjective activities of people in a society. In this dimension the phenomenological exploration of social phenomena could have subjective-idealistic bias because the creation or construction of knowledge was at the foreground of interest. This, however has created the trend to overshadow the other and more important dimension of social reality — emergence and functioning of social institutions — and mechanisms of their reproduction. Berger and Luckamnn book turned to be manifesto of the theory of society and of the institutionalisation of a social. In this dimension the construction means primarily the constitution of inter-subjective patterns, which is more of less spontaneous objectivation (crystallising) of past individual’s intentional actions, relations and (intra)subjective meanings. The policymaking and analysis should focusing primarily on those invisible inter-subjective social patterns (as the background ideational dimension) of visible-palpable “brute facts” (see: [Berger, Luckmann, 1991]). This was perfectly demonstrated already Evald Ilyenkov in his Dialectical Logic [Ilyenkov, 1977]. The other side of a coin is that this largely hidden dimension, should be reproduced (or called into being) only through current intentional and “confirm- structuring” [Haugaard, 2003]’ actions of people (voting at elections, paying right value in shops when using banknotes). Moreover, people have becoming active (constitutive) and would intend via those feedback loops already to influence those background ideational patterns [Schmidt, 2010]. Those foreground activities are far from directly constructing the social phenomena, but remains more or less trials and error process of influencing the process of institutionalisation [Hay 2006, 2016].

7 This term was coined by Haugaard in this expending the Giddens concept of structuration, which enable to avoid the functionalist traps.
Thus, policymaking largely intends to influence and direct those intentions of actors (common people) in a way, which could reproduce and reshape the social institutions in expected by politicians ways. The purpose of policy is to influence and change primarily the institutions as carriers of understandings, interpretations and habits (scripts) of people. One part of constructivist community, however, tries to overestimate the (their) role of intentional construction at the collective level (although at individual level it takes place continuously); they try to equate this (actually current feedback loops to institutionalisations) with the actual construction of social reality and to present this outcome as the core of the policy analysis and advice. The situation is even more interesting. This simplistic inversion of subjective idealism is used to have short-time political effects. For, the mediatising the politics [Klijn, 2014] is in high demand and would attract substantial resource from political actors who intend to get short-time political gains. However, in the perspective of long term handling of wicked issues such a subjective-idealistic bias weakens substantially the exploratory capacity of social mechanisms by constructivist approach, which is its main advantage [Gross, 2009]. This increases also the extreme relativistic interpretation of perspectivism and (paradoxically) increased the role of representational approach to interpretations. In this end the inversion of constitutive-constructive dimensions has been the main obstacle to the development of relational approach to social mechanisms and in interpreting social relations as unfolding transactions.

Fifth is largely linked with previous bias. The constructivists-interpretivists analytics could not for a long time to overcome neither the extreme relativism of their perspectivist positions, nor the limits of representational presumptions, although at the start they presumed to avoid the position of external observer in the cognition process [Schön, Rein, 1994; Wagenaar, 2015]. Those presumptions have limited also exploratory capacities of the positivist tradition. But, firstly, the positivist methodological presumption that a researcher is an external observer was clear and well reflected one; and, secondly, especially after Popper’s critical-rational overturn in the positivist’s epistemology, especially his fallibilist and learning concepts of rationality, they could overcome these limitation in their conception of interactive policy-making [Koopenjan, Klijn, 2004].

In the one end of constructivist-interpretive stream, the reasoning has been imbued with post-modern ideas of variety and uniqueness of actors cognitive positions. This hinders not only their capacity to provide generalisations, but has fragmented the constructivist camp in providing the more or less common understanding of the reality and its problems. This stance was combined with the need of sophisticated interpretation of texts and other symbolic systems. For these reasons these analysis of policies have a rather hetic style of deliberations (à la Bourdieu, Foucault) and interpretations. Although the critical discourse analysis may reveal (through the de-construction) the hidden sense of domination and manipulation in the current policy and political institutional context, their overall strategy could not guide us out of relativist indefinity of truth and let us in the endless labyrinth of Plato’s cave. Policy analysis in the overall uncertain context should provide more firm or and sustainable outputs.
On the other end, interpretivism could not definitively overcome also the presumption of external observer characteristic to representational principle. At the same time interpretivism did not guarantee us (or its political masters) the actual reflectiveness of the interpreter-experts in the context and of the focus groups ethos. I.e. it could not avoid the image of partial (empathetic) and at the same time context-restrained analyst. But it is a minor problem for interpretive analysis. The interpretivist approach, which claims to be able to explain deep mechanisms of the actual social reality [Ann Lin, 1998], could not overcome the paradox of drawing away horizon: the more complete knowledge of the world we have, the more complex, indeterminate and unknown it becomes for us (see: [Hay, 2011]).

Those are main reasons why constructivist-interpretivist stream have not utilised its implicit strength for a long time and why demand to its very professional analysis remained up to millennium relatively low among political masters as well as among policy advisers in the public sector.

POLICY PROCESS AS THE CRITICAL DIALOGUE:
LIMITS OF THE CONCEPTION OF WICKED ISSUES

Meantime we would not assert that constructivist interpretive theoretical stream did not approached to the solution of those dead-ends caused by paradoxes of perspectivism and representation [Wagenaar, 2015]. We would indicate two cases when they closely approached to the breaking of this vicious circle.

The first example is Rittel and Weber (1973) conception of wicked problems we already briefly referred on. They asserted that policy issues cannot be definitively solved and the true understanding of problems would be possible only after we have it already solved. But, this experience is not very useful because (rule 7) “every wicked problem is essentially unique” [Rittel, Webber, 1973, p. 164]. The government of a day could expect that it has solved some social problem through top to down imposition of a policy and even to have some (political) success: it has provided free soup hubs for homeless, afterwards nobody is dying in hungry. But it is largely not the solution to the poverty, which has not yet been solved in any society. I.e. the phenomena of poverty and its solutions are becoming much sophisticated, case based and merged with multiple other problems (problems of mental disorder, social exclusion, unique ways of life orientations etc.).

Modern political elites could give priority to “grand” problems and emotionally-laden solution to them aimed at collecting more votes at the elections. But this is an illusion: the horizon of solutions is not only drifting away, but the problem situation is becoming more puzzled. How the successful policy as the tool for actual solving public issues is at all possible?

Webber and Rittel put a standstill at their highly innovative approach. They expected that wicked issues cannot have stopping criteria. “The planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for reasons inherent in the ‘logic’ of the problem. He stops for considerations that are external to the problem: he runs out of time, or money, or patience. He finally says, ‘That’s good enough’” [Rittel, Webber, 1973, p. 162]. In other words: the wicked problem should be tamed and at some point
de-problemized (i.e. asserted that it’s just the solutions). It is not just a solution, but the declaration of that solution and often it is even ignoring of similar issues one would face. I.e. it is difficult to turn the conception of wicked issues into practice, because it should not ensure the sustainability of the policy at some point [Rittel, Webber, 1973, p. 162].

Foucault expects that at a certain point we face the mess of interconnected problems, which would be close to normality, i.e. they would be hardly managed via direct interventions [Foucault, 2009, p. 55–62]. However, he did not specify how the normalizing policymaking looks like.

The main reason of that impasse of Rittel and Webber, i.e. meeting the paradox of furthering of the horizon and/or applying subjective stopping rule was firstly the attempt to give rather different interpretation to the policy process in the framework of classical linear — “problems-solutions” — conceptual framework. They were able to explain the reverse sequence of problems and solutions but were not able to explain the mechanism of the policy outputs or new “order out of chaos” [Prigogine, Stengers, 1984], which already started to constitute at that time. (See next sub-chapter.) This is a typical situation in the period of scientific revolutions, which describes Thomas Kuhn: we cannot explore the phenomena because we are using the old vocabulary.

The second reason was even more substantial and it needs more in depth explanation to a reader. At this point we should introduce the Dewey’s concept of trans-actional relations [Dewey, Bentley, 1949].

Rittel and Webber tried to explain the management of wicked problems drawing at the same time on the concept of complexity. This fits with the positivist conception of interactive policymaking of actors in promoting their individual (or corporate) interests. L. Susskind, J. Koopenjan and E.-H. Klijn expected that in uncertain and ambiguous task environment, there are possibilities to reach points of consensus through packages deals (see: [Susskind, 2006; Susskind, McKearnan, Larmer, 1999; Koopenjan, 2004, 2016]). This mean the spread of risks and losses/gains throughout different parts of the policy “package” and different time points. This is also the core of rational choice institutionalism [Ostrom, 1997, 2005; Scharpf, 1997], which presume the persistence of trust and common pool rules that ensure the positive sum game situation for all actors in long-term perspective. This is the best way to deal with the complexity issues in the policy process.

The concept of contingency explored in the framework of constructivist-pragmatist paradigm is rather different from complexity and interactions, explored from positivist angle. Complexity means the interaction as a secondary output of different self-sufficient actors and solution — the gaming unless they reach the point of equilibrium of interests or consensus. They can accommodate their interests in the framework of package deals and also change their preferences when utility considerations change.

Here is a very point to refer to the Karl Marx understanding of human agency. It was based not on variable approach, but on relational approach which is in accord with the Dewey’s concept of contingency and transactions. This logic has become subject of attention in relational sociology, and we concretize it further in different
conceptions of policy analysis, which are based on that logic (see: [Emirbayer, 1997; Delea
tou, 2015]).

In the 3rd thesis Marx wrote: “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of
circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men
and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, there-
fore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coinci-
dence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing
can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. /.../ the
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is
the ensemble of the social relations” [Marx, 1998, p. 498]. We would translate this
famous passage into the language of contingency paradigm. I.e. concrete actors
and their roles are not “pre-given”; but they are being as potential subjects (poten-
tial fathers, professors, or politicians etc.) who are constituting in and by the con-
text. However, their constitution takes place only when actors confirm this process
via intentional actions (intentionality) and via escalating reproduction of relations
in which he/she finds itself in the context. This is like sculptor in processing the
stone or other beings (mothers, students, politicians) are becoming those actors
as soon as they are engaged into relations with others and mutually constituting (or
destroying) each other. For instance, the political actors and political system are
constituting via voting actions or via electoral rally in which voters and politicians
are constituting as actors (or agents). Or by buying a pint of beer we not only be-
come consumers but we also reproducing the monetary system and are contrib-
uting to the formation of exchange rate of EUR. This could also be translated into
the language of wicked issues, which also could be explained as constitution or
unfolding the context with the intentional actions (definitions, attempt to influence
context etc.).

I.e. from the angle of the context the actors and their roles are constituting
because “confirm structuring” actions are triggering the unfolding the syncretic
mess of relations. From the angle of individuals, they intentionally support this
process via mutual transactions, or practical mutual reflexion. This mechanism,
from behavioural perspective was explored drawing on pragmatist presumptions by
J.H. Mead. Hence, the contingency means the process of differentiation of the syn-
cretic and vague ‘whole’, through unfolding and constituting problems, its “agents”
and relations between them. This is how the policy and its outputs emerge. In this
way the initial or unstructured policy community could form in different dimen-
sions the arenas capable to respond to the problem situations differently and to
reconstitute the policy community according to pressures from the context (see:
[Mead, 1903]).

From pragmatist perspective, for the policy analyst and maker’s the main task
in not to solve the problems, because of policy (social) problems are not “given”.
Problems could be constituted in the course of the emergence of “unique doubt-
fulness” [Strübing, 2007] of an actor and only after targeted attempt to respond to
doubts or to interventions into problem situation [Dewey, Bentley, 1949]. Thus, in
order to work out policy-responses, we should actively trigger the unfolding process
of the new problem situation as still a syncretic pattern of interconnected potential
problems. From that mess would start to unfold not only problems but also simultaneously are constituting actors or policy stakeholders and their possible interactions. I.e. in the modern society, — as soon as we approach to the normality of the policy domain and do not need to tame single problems into politically feasible solutions, — the primary focus in managing a policy domain is not the searching for policy solutions but the constitution of permanent decision arenas and — as the table in chapter 5 indicated — the coordinating and managing these arenas. I.e. the spontaneous process of institutionalisation has already constituted those new roles and focuses. These policy networks and arenas contain major potential actors, who have readiness to take own responsibilities of concreted actions as soon as such a “doubtfulness” emerges. This is called the emergence of policy ownership [Checkland, Poulter, 2010]. As a result, actors start to re-configure their initial patterns and at some point is becoming capable to manage or hold the situation in the frames of normality.

In the modern society, rather, such an indeterminate context, where doubts or disequilibrium emerge, are becoming the rule. I.e. indeterminacy or policy failures are become a normality and attempts to tame this inconvenience is resulting in de-politicisation and de-problematisation which is a way to impasses. And vice versa, attempt to create order means the suppression of the dynamic development or unfolding human potentials.

The issue of infiniteness could be in this way removed from the infinity of problems-solutions dimension (which causes the drawing away of horizons) to the relational patterns of arenas. The transactions between actors and between arenas may constitute infinite new patterns of transactions (roles, actions, responses), which would produce the re-normalisation in the policy domain. Through this new angle to the policy process the policy actors actually are not solving the problems, but are responding to in-determinacy via concerted actions (as a rule via trials and errors). In this way the arenas are capable to re-establish new normality at the new, more sophisticated level. To establish such kind of arenas as potential triggers for infinite unfolding actor’s roles is not a very sophisticated tasks. For, rather many man and woman intentionally are creating such kind of unfolding patterns through marrying and developing infinite forms of family patterns. We hope that this model would explore also the emergence of policies.

REFRAMING OF INTRACTABLE CONTROVERSIES: TOWARDS THE CRITICAL DIALOGUE

The second example was the conception of reframing developed by D. Schön and M. Rein in 1990s. They try to study mechanisms of bridging or “living with” (P. Checkland) of intractable controversies. Instead of considering actors as carriers of objective interests, they considered actors as carriers of specific mental frames, which

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8 There is a specific institutional theory which explores institution-building in the context of disequilibrium or permanent crisis (or policy failure) [Hay, 2016; cf.: Hay, 2006; 2011].
form the basis for their practical actions and communications. Thus the policy process becomes interpreted as primarily communicative process of finding collective responses to the contextual pressures (see: [Checkland, Poulter, 2010, p. 191–192; Schön, Rein, 1994].

They differentiated rhetorical frames, which remain at the level of deliberative contest of grand narratives or schemas of interpretation, which draw mainly on text or speeches. Rhetorical frames develop into logically coherent but internally tautologic reasoning, and for this reason they become increasingly incompatible and in-communicable between opposites of contest. I.e. at the level of grand narratives, the discourse leads actually to much deeper conflict of frames and into impasse of political discourse.

Action frames, on the contrary "are constructed from the evidence provided by observation of patterns of action inherent in the practice of policy practitioners... The action in question... includes both the design of policy objects (for example, the formulation of laws, regulation, or programs) and the behaviour through which practitioners enact such policies... Policy practice becomes frame reflective when the actors involved in policy disputes not only act from their action frames but turn their thought back onto the frames themselves and engage in reciprocal inquiry aimed at unblocking design inquiry that has been paralyzed. In these open zones of inquiry — which tend to occur at ‘policy windows’ — assumptions, views of the world, and values that have heretofore remained in the background, giving shape to foreground inquiry but keeping, as it were, to the shadows, become foreground issues, open to discussion and inquiry in their own right" [Schön, Rein, 1994, p. 94].

This is in our mind the turning point of constructivist policy analysis, however not yet complete. On the one hand, Schön and Rein revealed the mechanism of bridging of controversies, which in deliberative practice are deepening, but which in the real action-situations would result in practical outcomes. However, they still considered the reflection over of basic (conceptual) presumption of frames, i.e. the passive cognitive operations as a source of outcomes and not considering the unfolding of the context and practice as a source which would trigger these reflections. I.e. solutions are still in the sphere of cognitive or representational activities. In their book “Frame reflection”. Shön and Rein developed the new concept of the design rationality applied in the policy formation. They started to consider re-positioning of actors in networks as well as actor’s and environment as transactions, i.e. as a way to “unpack” or open up new solutions through the practical design. However, in their book they did not have enough space for linking their mechanism of reframing to the development of transactional logic of policy-formation [Buchanan, 1992].

For the reconstructing the missing link and definitive breaking the perspectivist-representational dead-end we have to return back to the relational rationale of contingency and transactions (versus complexity and interactions). One the one hand we should draw on the presumption that social facts (and moreover their meanings and its interpretations) do not have per se immanent properties, which could be perceived or observed in various ways by outside observers. Those facts (meanings) should be constituted and revealed through practical interventions aimed at
solution of dilemmas or inconveniences which actors have faced. Henrdik Wagenaar (2015), drawing on Hacking\(^9\) considered *intervention* as the different, action-based detection of reality in the course of practical redesign of reality. Thus, pragmatist do not use the concept of cognition as activity of (clever and intelligent) observer, but concepts of inquiry, probing, inference, interpellations, recursion etc.

How we can act and change the reality without tentatively knowing about it?

“In an interventionist approach to meaning the “structural” features of social reality are the emergent property of the interactions of individual actors. They are not so much the willed, deliberate outcome of human design (although design may very well have been the impetus that spurred the action), but the unintended consequence of the interactions of actors with each other and with the world” [Wagenaar, 2015, p. 138].

This is similar to the way a child who cannot read and even speak is able smoothly to learn the work of the tablet and can do this much better that adult who rely on manufacturer’s complex instructions. He/ she is acting without presumptions, and through trying and probing the child is “unpaking” the practical tools of managing the programs.

On the other hand, the *design rationality* [Schön, Rein, 1994] considers any creative (versus routine) intervention into the reality aimed at re-constituting it as the dialogue with the material. This is not merely the intentional inference or even change of the reality, but the constitution of its properties in the context. The concept of design is originated from art sciences and describes (as we already pictured it) the way the sculptor is creating through the “dialogue” with stone the statue of the individual. In this way we approach from the another angle to the phenomena of relational contingency. Hence this could be explored through the angle of Gadamer’s notion of fusion of horizons and Herbert Mead’s concept of reflective communication. The immanent limits of actor’s initial positions and his/her (passive) cognitive horizon (or frames of reference) could be exceeded only when he/she broke this horizon by the “other”, similarly limited and passive actor’s horizon’s. But those horizons are asymmetrically related and enable to look at owns limits or inadequate representation for another angle. This is not simply like ballerina is dancing before the mirror, but the interpretation of dancing through the another frame is now visible to ballerina. As the result of the fusion or intervention of horizons, or their mutual transaction — the new meanings emerge. In this way only through the active dialogue (or opening’s) between actors or fusion of their horizons the limits or one-dimensionality but also infinity of actor’s representations become mutually translated and mediated as Bruno Latour would say. The outcome is the constitution of new dimensions and properties (meanings) of reality. This could be presented also as a kind of multiple synthesises at the policy arenas after the skilful management or bridging of frames, which was explored earlier by Schön and Rein.

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\(^9\) A very similar concept “predmentaja dejatel’nost” is at the centre of Leontiev’s concept of formation of consciousness. This idea was further developed by E. Ilyenkov in his dialectical logic and dejatelnistny podhod.
Dewey is looking at this dialogical process completely relationally: as clearing up (concretization) of problem situation, which should be “unpacked” into multiple concrete contexts. This is not at all the fragmentation of the whole and also not at all the concretization in traditional sense. It is like a panorama in eagle’s eye at the height of two kilometres can identify borders of the phenomena (forest, river, desert). But after reducing the altitude to 200 meters, the eagle could catch, what could be said, as definition of forest, which constitutes trees, grass, animals, berries, and the eagle can redefine its purposes (to catch the mouse or to drink a water).

The vaguely defined whole has been re-constituted into numerous variety of relations-patterns, actors, properties. The previously messy whole is composed by multiple the concrete context or sites which are not the more concrete representations but like keyholes through which the whole would be conceived through different angles. Only at that level the context could be handled and de-composed into smaller interconnected sites which are forming at the same time the concrete whole. Obviously the Dewey’s understanding has an affinity with the Hegel’s concept of the “concrete”. This logic re-constituted the very concept of the policy in sense of successfully managing “wicked issues”. At the level of the whole or great narratives we can tame the single part of a problem but not to manage it, for instance the poverty; we can manage the poverty at the level of multiple concrete sites or cases. These sites are like a gout of the rain or spotlight in theatre (i.e. Hamlet’s monolog) where big narratives of human existence or policies could be in a nutshell explored and acted upon. Only in this spotlight actors can in a very practical terms influence the (their own) reality and make the policy. At the grand level it remains the rhetorical activity. In the process of unfolding or “unpacking” the problem situation many such a spotlights emerge and the social reality can be changed in case there are multiple policy arenas “on hold” at different tiers of governance, which are activated continuously. Hence the policymaking and politics are becoming a part of our everyday life, first of all our family and primary groups. This was the core idea of Foucault’s concept of governmentality.

These ideas have triggered, on the one hand, the techniques of handling policy problems and producing solutions based on the methodology of critical pragmatism. This methodology is perfectly analysed by Hendrik Wagenaar in “Meaning in action: interpretation and dialogue in policy analysis”. As the policy-analytical technique this conception has been worked out and applied by John Forester in 1990s. J. Forester’s method and experience of managing policy arenas, which participants initially hold irreconcilable frames (on aborts or sexual orientation issues but also city planning issues) deserves the distinct paper. He was able to summarize implicitly these conceptual innovations in the practical language of managing policy process and producing policy outputs [Forester, 2009; cf. Forester, 2012]. In this article we would only summarize the general outcome of this journey which confirms many premises of pragmatism of the methodology of social analysis.
**CONCLUSION: TOWARDS METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS**

We have followed the story of policy analysis from two opposite angles of positivism and constructivism. This story is summarised in the table 2.

*Table 2. Evolution of methodological pluralism in policy analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus of the policymaking: <strong>policy substance, content</strong></th>
<th>Policy as the comprehensive <strong>plan and program</strong></th>
<th><strong>Empirical positivism</strong>, universal solutions, causal explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyst role: neutral scientific research, mapping the domain</td>
<td><strong>Policy decision: the best alternative options</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy as argumentation and dialogue; policy as the design in action-based reflective communication</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy as policy advocacy (consulting) and strategy design</strong></td>
<td><strong>Analyst role</strong>: consulting, policy advocacy, “quick and dirty advice”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analyst roles</strong>: mediation and empowerment techniques, bridging (translation) of frames, argumentative techniques</td>
<td><strong>Policy decision: mutually compatible patterns of the puzzle</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy decision: the feasible incremental solution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism and interpretivism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy as the management of policy arenas and communities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Analyst role</strong>: policy entrepreneurs, actor’s analysis, arenas design and management;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural (symbolic) dimension of policy communications (discourse)</td>
<td><strong>Policy decision: the consensus, overlapping areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy decision: the consensus, overlapping areas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplified and ad hoc policy patterns and solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general trend has been firstly, the shift of the policy analysis from the focus of the substance (or policy program) to the developing of analytical and practical capacities to manage policy arenas. This development resulted in the conceptions
of interactive policy and transactive policy dialogue. Meaningful, that whereas the former is searching for consensus between actors playing political games [Susskind, McKearnan, Larmer, 1999], the latter are searching for compatibility patterns of actors and solutions [Forester, 2009; Winship, 2006]. The Dutch school of policy analysis provided the hexagon model of methodologies of policy analysis [Mayer, Van Daalen, Bots, 2004; Thissen, Walker, 2013], which later was applied in comprehensive empirical study of the policy process. We simplified this a bit over-structured account and expect that the intersecting and complementary areas are much larger.

Both streams have solved their conceptual impasses through integrating basic approaches of the pragmatist theory. It is meaningful that this took place in the policy science which is profoundly practical science. Hence it should dismiss for pragmatic outcomes a heavy debates on the controversies at the level of ontology and epistemology and try to combine the traditional positivist and constructivist tools as practical research programs in promoting practical policy solutions. The general outcome of this cycle was the emergence of methodological pluralism and opening a way to mixed method inquiry [Morgan, 2014].

We already indicated the trend to draw of both methodologies on similar concepts in exploring the policy process in extremely uncertain task environments. There have been rather breaking works in the policy analysis, which draws on the mixed methodological premises. Frank Fisher draws on Toulmin famous work on argumentation analysis and developed an extensive framework of policy evaluation, based on different methodologies [Fischer, 2006]. Emery Roe introduces the narrative policy analysis and Christopher Winship developed the analysis as puzzling aimed to provide reliable problem definitions to complex policy problems via their simplification. Ann Lin provided highly cited work “Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative Methods” where the application of mixed methods approach was explored [Ann Lin, 1998].

References


Thus, pragmatism acts as a new paradigm to replace an older way of thinking about the differences between approaches to research by treating those differences as social contexts for inquiry as a form of social action, rather than as abstract philosophical systems [Morgan, 2014, p. 5].

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